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Minding the Liability Gap:
American Contractors, Iraq, and
the Outsourcing of Impunity
CHRISTINA M. BLYTH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to
the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will
be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.
-Justice Brandeis'
In recent history, private contractors working for the U.S. govern-
ment have assumed an ever-increasing amount of responsibility for
overseas operations previously conducted by the U.S. military, espe-
cially in conjunction with the War on Terror and the war in Iraq.2
Today, widely accepted estimates place the total number of American
contractors in Iraq at somewhere over 100,0003 (and growing), and it
has been projected that in the coming months, that figure will surpass
the total number of American troops in the war-torn country.4 Moreo-
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University. I would like to thank Stephen Vladeck, Associate Professor, American University
Washington College of Law, for his help in crafting this paper. I would also like to thank my
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1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV.
1, 61 (2001). Some contractors, such as Lockheed Martin, have integrated themselves deeply into
the fabric of U.S. governmental operations. See, e.g., Tim Weiner, Lockheed and the Future of
Warfare, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 2004, § 3, at I (describing the numerous services Lockheed
provides and its role in the modernization of warfare). Lockheed performs a variety of services
for numerous governmental agencies, including the IRS, the FAA, and the U.S. Census Bureau.
Id.; see also infra Part III.
3. Throughout this note, there will be many references to the approximate number of
contractors operating in Iraq. As a point of clarification, "100,000" refers to the total number of
contractors working in the country performing military and civilian functions. Sources indicate
that the number of private contractors performing military duties is approximately 20,000. See
infra note 41.
4. Deborah Avant, What Are Those Contractors Doing in Iraq?, WASH. POST, May 9, 2004,
at BOI (observing that in 1991, the military employed one private contractor in Iraq for every sixty
active-duty military personnel, whereas in 2003, the ratio jumped to approximately one in ten);
see also Audio recording: Peter Raven-Hansen, Remarks at the Association for American Law
Schools Annual Meeting, Section on National Security Law, Outsourcing the War on Terrorism:
Extraordinary Rendition, Shadow Warriors, Dirty Assets, and Battlefield Contractors (Jan. 5,
2006), available at http://www.aals.org/am2006/program/thursday.html.
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ver, these contractors have assumed a role increasingly resembling that
of the troops-the Vice President of Blackwater USA, one of the largest
employers of Iraq-based contractors, went so far as to assert that his own
company is a "party to the conflict." 5
With the proliferation of the U.S. military's reliance on contractors
as a means of supplementing-and not just supplying-the troops on the
ground, serious questions have arisen with respect to the legal regime
governing the contractors' conduct. Take the case of David Passaro.6
Passaro, a CIA contractor working in Afghanistan, was recently con-
victed in North Carolina on criminal charges of assault and battery for
beating Abdul Wali, an Afghan detainee, during interrogations.' Prose-
cutors allege that "Passaro created a 'chamber of horrors' for Wali,
ordering soldiers not to allow him to sleep, limiting his access to food
and water, and subjecting him to two consecutive nights of interroga-
tions and beatings."8 Wali later died of his injuries.9 After Passaro was
sentenced, U.S. Attorney George Holding said, "Passaro's conduct was
truly a heinous crime .... It was an affront to every man and woman
serving overseas trying to bring freedom and the rule of law to those
who are oppressed."'"
In sentencing, however, Passaro's attorney depicted him as a hero
who had "answered the call" to work for the CIA as a private contrac-
tor." Aside from the unprecedented criminal charges, Passaro's case
raises a vitally important question of civil liability: Specifically, does
Wali's estate have a civil remedy against Passaro and ultimately against
the U.S. government under whose authority Passaro interrogated Wali?
This question may seem like an isolated issue in an isolated case, but the
reality in Iraq tells a far different story. Indeed, as pressure increases to
5. Vice President, Blackwater, USA, Our Children's Children's War (Discovery Channel
television broadcast Mar. 11, 2007). Blackwater's
largest obtainable government contract is with the State Department, for providing
security to US diplomats and facilities in Iraq. That contract began in 2003 with the
company's $21 million no-bid deal to protect Iraq proconsul Paul Bremer.
Blackwater has guarded the two subsequent US ambassadors, John Negroponte and
Zalmay Khalilzad, as well as other diplomats and occupation offices. Its forces
have protected more than ninety Congressional delegations in Iraq, including that of
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.
Jeremy Scahill, Bush's Shadow Army, NATION, Apr. 2, 2007, at 11, available at http://www.
thenation.com/doc/20070402/scahill.
6. See Andrea Weigl, Passaro Will Serve 8 Years for Beating, NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 14,




10. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id.; see also Estes Thompson, Ex-CIA Contractor Found Guilty of Assaulting Afghan
Detainee, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 17, 2006, WL 8/17/06 APALERTNC 13:49:56.
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reduce the size of the American military presence, the military's reliance
on independent contractors will only increase. Ultimately, the responsi-
bilities that the contractors are assuming will also increase.
And yet, the legal regime that governs those contractors is at best
unclear, given the contractors generally fall outside the auspices of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice."2 The inevitable question that arises
then is whether the contractors are legally responsible for their conduct
anywhere near to the same extent that U.S. soldiers would be under the
same circumstances. And if not, does the increasing reliance on these
contractors actually decrease the United States' accountability for its
actions in Iraq? Put differently, does the ill-defined legal status of these
contractors ultimately create a legal black hole because traditional mili-
tary law does not apply? Or might civil remedies, which are generally
unavailable against soldiers, provide the necessary deterrent to ensure
that American contractors are abiding by even the most basic dictates of
American law in their conduct in Iraq? These questions have been dan-
gerously understudied. Needless to say, the time for a thorough exposi-
tion of the landscape of civil remedies against overseas contractors is
long overdue.
This note concerns the question of accountability. My focus is on
the accountability of the U.S. government for the actions of their private
contractors.' 3 In Part II, I discuss the necessity and importance of a civil
right of action in these cases. Part III will examine the era of privatiza-
tion and rise of the private contractor in the War on Terror. Part IV
demonstrates the lack of accountability for U.S.-directed contractor
abuse under current law. Finally, in Part V, I examine mechanisms for
minding the liability gap between the rights of the abused and the liabil-
ity of those ultimately responsible.
II. THE NECESSITY OF A CIVIL RIGHT OF ACTION
Unless recovery is allowed in each instance where there has been a
12. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000). The Uniform Code of Military Justice governs the
behavior of soldiers on the battlefield. The Code was also recently amended to allow coverage to
a small number of contractors. The new provision changes paragraph 10 of Article 2 to read: "In
time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed
force in the field." 10 U.S.C.A § 802(10) (West 2007). This change was likely enacted in order
to extend code coverage to those conflicts that are not officially declared wars by Congress.
13. This note does not address the availability of civil remedies against the individual or
corporate entity that may be responsible for potential tort injury in foreign jurisdictions. Further,
this note does not address the availability of civil remedies against particular individuals and
corporate entities in the United States. Such a discussion would be far beyond the scope of this
paper, as it is limited to governmental liability. Such remedies against individual and corporate
defendants would likely be available under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 in federal courts, and also potentially
in state courts under common-law tort doctrine.
2008]
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violation of a right, the violations will be repeated with impunity, and
that which is wrong will come to be regarded as something right.
Unless it is faced and dealt with, wrong will have the same stature as
right.
-J.D. Lee & Barry Lindahl"4
In considering human-rights violations by government-directed
contractors, it is first imperative to establish that a civil action for dam-
ages is necessary and proper. Civil remedies represent a vital tool in the
enforcement of human-rights standards as well as an important vehicle
for victim rehabilitation.' 5 Civil cases can be commenced when the
government with criminal jurisdiction is either unable or unwilling to
prosecute owing to evidentiary or political concerns.16 Further, even
when criminal proceedings are an option, civil cases provide an effective
compliment to such proceedings as they offer the victim "a legal remedy
which they control and which may satisfy needs not met by the criminal
law system."17
Tort law seeks to achieve a number of goals. First, it serves as a
method of financial indemnification of the victim.1 8 Although the entry
of a monetary judgment does not "heal" the victim, it often provides the
funds necessary for the victim to seek the necessary psychological treat-
ment. 9 More broadly, a monetary judgment often plays a much larger
role: deterrence.2 ° In other words, tort law seeks to make the risk of
injury more costly than the value of the questionable conduct.21 As a
related function, tort law is concerned with the definition and defense of
social norms by expressing a consensus about the way in which people
should relate to and interact with each other, and by communicating that
consensus to the general public. 2 A judgment ordering the payment of
14. J.D. LEE & BARRY LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW § 1:1 (2d ed. 2002).
15. See id.
16. See John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes as an
Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 47-49 (1999) (arguing in favor of
civil suits over criminal suits given, in part, the lower standards of proof and the increased
availability of discovery devices).
17. Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit
the Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 581 (1997).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
19. See Stephens, supra note 17, at 604-05.
20. See George Norris Stavis, Note, Collecting Judgments in Human Rights Torts Cases-
Flexibility for Non-Profit Litigators?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 209, 217 (1999) ("Vigorous
tort litigation against such persons may reduce the incidence of such acts, as it does in more
conventional arenas.").
21. See id.
22. See Harold Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combating Terrorism
Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 169, 185 (1987). In this way, a
civil judgment "awarding compensatory and punitive damages to a victim of terrorism serves the
twin objectives of traditional tort law, compensation and deterrence." Id.
[Vol. 62:651
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money damages necessarily includes an assessment that a legal right of
the plaintiff was violated, and each individual expression of liability
"adds its voice to others in the international community collectively con-
demning [such acts] as an illegitimate means of promoting individual
and sovereign ends."23 In comparison to a criminal suit, a civil suit may
better preserve a collective memory and "permit a more thorough airing
of victims' stories ... along with an expression of judicial solicitude. 24
In this regard, a criminal proceeding may be focused on the culpability
of the perpetrator at the expense of the harm suffered by the victim.25
Over the course of American legal history, civil litigation has often
been used to impact social reform. 26  This may explain in part why
American lawyers gravitate toward lawsuits aimed at addressing human-
rights violations, since such litigation is an important part of the legal
culture.27 In the United States, it is generally accepted that lawsuits seek
remedies designed with an eye to the future.28 The goal of prospective
relief often supersedes the remedies for past wrongs. The growth of
public-interest litigation led to an increase of attorneys tasked with liti-
gating such cases.29
U.S. scholars have long explained the benefits that civil litigation
affords the victims, the human-rights movement as a whole, and society
overall.3° Civil litigation may lead to a full investigation of the facts of
an incident, identify the persons or entities responsible, and perhaps
most importantly, pronounce a public judgment against those responsi-
23. Id.; see also Stephens, supra note 17, at 604-05 ("[A] judicial finding of liability puts a
formal, official stamp upon a judgment, which may at least partially satisfy the need for
acknowledgement of the wrong inflicted on the victims.").
24. Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadie Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031,
2101 (1998) (noting the psychological benefits of civil suits to victims).
25. Id. at 2102-03.
26. See NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980s AND
BEYOND 8-9 (1989); see also Oliver A. Houck, With Charityfor All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1439-42
(1984) (describing the roots of the public-interest law); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social
Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 224-41 (1976) (describing
the "second wave" of public-interest litigation, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s and focusing on
issues such as consumer and environmental protection).
27. See ARON, supra note 26, at 96-97 ("[Mlany kinds of professionals in different types of
organizations can effectively educate, advocate, and lobby for a good cause, but it take lawyers to
harness the power of the judiciary in the struggle for social change. In many situations, litigation
is the only hope of achieving success.").
28. See Houck, supra note 26, at 1442-43.
29. See id.
30. BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN
U.S. COURTS 234 (1996) ("[T]he plaintiffs in these cases are concerned about much more than
money. They take tremendous personal satisfaction from filing a lawsuit, forcing the defendant to
answer in court or to abandon the United States, and creating an official record of the human
rights abuses inflicted on them or their families.") (footnote omitted).
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ble. 31 Even absent the entry of judgment, the defendant may be "pun-
ished" by public exposure.32 Although not a substitute for criminal
prosecution as a means of accountability, civil remedies complement
such prosecutions where they are possible, and serve an important role
where criminal prosecution is not an option.3 3 Public-interest litigation
has led the U.S. public, judiciary, and legal advocates to view civil liti-
gation as a potential means to realize large-scale policy goals, and to
31hold accountable perpetrators of egregious human-rights abuses.
The U.S. government has sanctioned provisions for civil remedies
against those responsible for egregious human-rights abuses.3 5 In the
topic at bar, it is critical that a victim of abuse suffered at the hands of a
government-directed contractor have a civil remedy against the U.S.
government. But will the United States be as accommodating when it is
held responsible? Without such a remedy, the United States is arguably
establishing a "right" by condoning the "wrong" of government-directed
contractor abuse.
III. ERA OF PRIVATIZATION 36
We are a party to the conflict.
-Vice President, Blackwater USA3 7
Privatization has played a prevalent role in the domestic landscape
in recent history. Everything from prisons, educational programs, and
othpr welfare programs have been handed over to private agencies.38
Far less attention, however, has been paid to privatization in the foreign-
affairs arena. The United States now relies regularly on private parties
to provide all forms of foreign aid and diplomatic services, and even to
participate in military endeavors. 39 These military functions include not
31. See id.
32. See id.; Alvarez, supra note 24, at 2101.
33. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 30, at 234 & n.8.
34. See id.
35. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 30, at 2-5, for a description of how human-rights
activists and litigators around the world seek to hold accountable those responsible for egregious
human-rights abuses. Because international mechanisms of accountability often prove both
inefficient and ineffective, enforcement is often left at the domestic level.
36. A recent symposium issue of the Harvard Law Review even goes so far as to declare that
we are in "an era of privatization." See Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116
HAv. L. REv. 1212 (2003).
37. Our Children's Children's War, supra note 5.
38. See, e.g., Simon Domberger & Paul Jensen, Contracting Out by the Public Sector:
Theory, Evidence, Prospects, OXFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y, Winter 1997, at 67, 72-75 (arguing that
privatization is efficient in a variety of contexts); F. Howard Nelson & Nancy Van Meter, What
Does Private Management Offer Public Education?, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 271, 271-72
(2000) (discussing private management of public schools).
39. See generally Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and
[Vol. 62:651
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only support services such as constructing weapons and building bar-
racks, but also core activities such as intelligence gathering, security ser-
vices, and conducting combat-related services.4 ° One only needs to look
at recent events to view the sharp increase in the use of private govern-
mental contractors. For example, not only are there approximately
20,000 private military contractors in Iraq, but the Abu Ghraib prison
scandal revealed that even such sensitive tasks as military interrogations
have been privatized."
When the work of the national-defense industry went into high gear
after the terrorist attacks on September 11, Pentagon reliance on private
military companies skyrocketed.42 Private contractors played a major
role in the Afghan war, served in paramilitary CIA units that hit the
ground before other combat troops, and were used in surveillance and
targeting plans.43 Major Gary Tallman, an Army spokesman, acknowl-
edged the unprecedented level of outsourcings since September 11 and
commented that "[t]he Army is much smaller than in the past ....
When you run out of soldiers and they don't have an expertise, one way
to get that capability on the battlefield is to contract it."44
The U.S. government's use of private contractors to transport ter-
rorism suspects to countries known to practice torture has also raised
many questions. On December 18, 2001, for example, American opera-
tives reportedly participated "in what amounted to a kidnapping of two
the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 135 (2005)
(discussing the privatization of emergency foreign aid and the staggering growth of private
military contractors).
40. See id. at 148. "[T]hese military services include not only support services, such as food,
accommodations, and sanitation for troops on the battlefield, but also core functions such as
translating, intelligence gathering, and even troop training-functions that, for at least the past
fifty years, uniformed members of the armed services have performed virtually exclusively." Id.
(footnote omitted).
41. Jonathan Turley, Commentary, Soldiers of Fortune-At What Price?, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2004, at B 11; see also Joshua Chaffin, Private Workers Found Central to Jail Abuse, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 27, 2004, at 7 (discussing an investigation into the conduct of CACI
International, a Virginia-based defense contractor, in interrogating detainees at Abu Ghraib).
42. See P.W. Singer, Warriors for Hire in Iraq, SALON.COM, Apr.15, 2004, http://dir.salon.
com/story/news/feature/2004/04/15/warriors/index.html?source=search&aim=/news/feature.
43. See id. ("[Private contractors] deployed with U.S. military forces on the ground (including
serving in the CIA paramilitary units that were the first to hit the ground), maintained combat
equipment, provided logistical support, and routinely flew on joint surveillance and targeting
aircraft. Even the noted Global Hawk unmanned surveillance plans were operated by private
employees."); see also David Washburn & Bruce V. Bigelow, Debate on Military Contractors
Heats Up, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 7, 2004, at Al; Dan Guttman, Commentary, The
Shadow Pentagon: Private Contractors Play a Huge Role in Basic Government Work-Mostly out
of Public View, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Sept. 29, 2004, http://www.publicintegrity.org/
pns/report.aspx?aid=386.
44. Washburn & Bigelow, supra note 43, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted).
20081
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Egyptians .. .who had sought asylum in Sweden."45 Believed to be
linked to Islamic militant groups, the Egyptians were "abruptly seized in
the late afternoon and flown out of Sweden a few hours later on a U.S.
government-leased Gulfstream 5 private jet to Cairo, where they under-
went extensive, and brutal, interrogation" at the hands of private
contractors.46
The United States became a party to the United Nations' Conven-
tion Against Torture in 1988, which forbids signatories from engaging in
torture or other inhuman treatment or punishment.47 The Convention
Against Torture prohibits actual governments like the United States
from engaging in torture or other inhuman treatment of prisoners, but the
Convention's applicability to private actors, even those hired by signato-
ries, is unclear. In addition to military personnel at the prison, sources
note .that the U.S. Army has hired private contractors to augment its
interrogation and intelligence workforce.45 Many contractors have been
inadequately trained, with more than a third of these contractors not
receiving "formal training in military interrogation techniques, policy, or
doctrine."49 The Abu Ghraib scandal raises a critical question: whether
the contractors are legally responsible for their conduct anywhere near to
the same extent as U.S. soldiers would be in the same circumstances.
Further, is the United States able to escape liability as a sovereign state
by simply outsourcing activities questionable under international law to
independent contractors?
IV. No AVAILABLE RELIEF UNDER CURRENT LAW
A government is the most dangerous threat to man's rights: it holds a
legal monopoly on the use of physical force against legally disarmed
victims.
-Ayn Rand5°
A. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The main avenue by which individuals can seek monetary relief
45. SEYMouR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO Anu GHRAIB 53
(2004).
46. Id.
47. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. ("No State Party shall expel,
return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.").
48. See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line Increasingly Blurred Between Soldiers and
Civilian Contractors, WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at Al.
49. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REvIEw
DoD DETENTION OPERATIONS 69 (2004).
50. Ayn Rand, Check Your Premises: Man's Rights, OBIECTIVIST NEWSL., Apr. 1963, at 14.
[Vol. 62:651
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from the U.S. government in the form of damages is the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA"). The FTCA generally abrogates the sovereign
immunity of the United States for certain torts.5t To have a claim under
the FTCA, injuries must be caused by the negligence or the wrongful
acts "of any government employee of the agency while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.""2 When enacting this comprehensive legislation, Congress
intended the U.S. government to be liable for "garden-variety torts" by
its employees, such as negligence while driving governmental vehi-
cles. 53 Although the scope of the FrCA appears at first to be far reach-
ing, Congress has created numerous requirements and exceptions that, if
not met, will bar relief under the act. In the following paragraphs, I will
discuss only those exceptions that are applicable to the scenario of
potential civil relief against the United States for government-directed
contractor abuse abroad.
1. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
THEIR OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT
The FTCA potentially creates liability for direct employees of the
U.S. government because the FTCA defines the term "employee of the
government" to cover nearly all federal employees in both civilian and
military sectors. 54 The question of governmental employment becomes
unclear when a contractor is involved. The FTCA defines employees of
the government to include not only officers or employees of a federal
agency, but also "persons acting on behalf of a federal agency."55 The
term "federal agency" includes "the executive departments, the judicial
51. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2000).
52. Id. § 2672.
53. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 706 n.4 (2004) (discussing the foreign-
country exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act where a Mexican national was abducted from
Mexico and brought to the United States for trial)
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 provides in pertinent part:
"Employee of the government" includes (1) officers or employees of any federal
agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, members of
the National Guard while engaged in training or duty under section 115, 316, 502,
503, 504, or 505 of title 32, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an
official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States,
whether with or without compensation, and (2) any officer or employee of a Federal
public defender organization, except when such officer or employee performs
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and legislative branches, the military departments, independent estab-
lishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as
instrumentalities or agencies of the United States. 56 The "instrumental-
ities and agencies" clause is misleading as it specifically excludes gov-
ernmental contractors.57
The underpinnings of the independent-contractor exception are
highlighted in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Orleans:
Billions of dollars of federal money are spent each year on projects
performed by people and institutions which contract with the Govern-
ment. These contractors act for and are paid by the United States.
They are responsible to the United States for compliance with the
specifications of a contract or grant, but they are largely free to select
the means of its implementation.... Similarly, by contract, the Gov-
ernment may fix specific and precise conditions to implement federal
objectives. Although such regulations are aimed at assuring compli-
ance with goals, the regulations do not convert the act of entrepre-
neurs ... into federal governmental acts.58
The critical factor in determining if a contractor is an employee or
an independent contractor is whether the government has the power to
"control the detailed physical performance of the contractor."59 The
inquiry is not whether the contractor receives federal funds and must
comply with federal standards and regulations, but whether the federal
government supervises the contractor's day-to-day operations.60  As
such, whether a contractor is truly independent may present a close fac-
tual case.6'
The "right of control" standard is an incredibly hard standard to
meet. How could contractors prove that the government had physical
day-to-day control over their activities? Additionally, if the United
States uses contractors to promote efficiency,62 why then would it make
sense for the United States to control every aspect of the day-to-day
operations? This is a virtually impossible standard to meet. As dis-
cussed in the next section, even governmental employees are aware that
certain actions and behaviors are implicit in their job duties.63 Why
56. Id.
57. Id. ("[T]he term 'federal agency' includes .. .and corporations primarily acting as
instrumentalities or agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor with the
United States.") (emphasis added).
58. 425 U.S. 807, 815-16 (1976).
59. Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 527-28 (1973).
60. See Orleans, 425 U.S. at 817-18.
61. See McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464, 472 (10th Cir. 1983) (reversing a grant of
summary judgment arguing that whether plaintiff could recover on a tort claim for damages due to
weapons manufacturing was a question of fact and appropriate for the district court).
62. See Washburn & Bigelow, supra note 43, at Al.
63. See discussion infra Part IVA.2.
[Vol. 62:651
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should a contractor, with express directions by the government to
accomplish a task, be treated any differently? If the government should
have to exert such day-to-day control to satisfy such a high standard so
as to defeat the efficiency argument for using contractors in the first
place, there must be some other reason contractors are being used.
Could that reason be that outsourcing liability for actions like torture or
other abuses makes it virtually impossible for the government to be held
liable for those acts, and furthermore saves the government from bad
publicity? Does this ill-defined legal status of governmental contractors
ultimately create a legal black hole?
2. THE WESTFALL ACT AND ACTING WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
The Westfall Act confers immunity on federal employees by "mak-
ing an FTCA action against the Government the exclusive remedy for
torts committed by Government employees in the scope of their employ-
ment."64 The Attorney General may certify that an employee of the fed-
eral government was acting within the scope of their employment.65 As
such, a suit that may have been brought previously against a specific
governmental employee on certification may in turn be converted into a
suit against the U.S. government under the FTCA.66 The process for
determining whether a federal employee was acting within the scope of
his employment is often complicated and at times convoluted. When a
court decides the issue, judges traditionally apply the law of the state in
which the alleged tort occurred, or if no state law is in point, judges will
apply the principles of agency law.67
Recently, the question of an employee acting within the scope of
64. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 163 (1991); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2000).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) provides as follows:
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting
within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which
the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a
United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States
under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States
shall be substituted as the party defendant.
Id.
66. See id.
67. The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is
not unexpectable by the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958); see also Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d
26, 33 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying the principles of agency to determine whether the defendants were
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his governmental employment was addressed by the D.C. Circuit in
Rasul v. Rumsfeld.68 In Rasul, the court discussed the scope of employ-
ment requirement of the Westfall Act in substituting the individual
named defendants with the U.S. government.69 There, the court found
that virtually any type of conduct can be considered "incidental" and
thus within the scope of the employment of the governmental employee,
"so long as the action has some nexus to the action authorized."70
More interesting, however, is the court's willingness to consider
torture or other intentional torts as both foreseeable and within the
potential scope of employment for the governmental employees at
Guantdinamo Bay.71 The court stated that "[t]he plaintiffs' allegations of
torture, though reprehensible, do not offset the presumption that these
individuals were acting on behalf of their employer during 'the course of
performing job duties."' 72 Further, the court held that in fact, the torture
of the detainees in question was even foreseeable.73 The court reasoned
that the inquiry was "necessarily whether the intentional tort was fore-
seeable, or whether it was unexpectable in view of the duties of the
servant."74 The court further reasoned that "the heightened climate of
anxiety" after September 11, which created pressure to capture the ter-
rorists, "would naturally lead to a greater desire to procure information
and, therefore, more aggressive techniques for interrogation. '7 5 As
such, the court concluded that individual employees' situations "did not
present a mere opportunity for tortious activity to occur but provided the
kindling for such activity to grow without the appropriate
supervision. 76
This argument has powerful repercussions. After all, how is it pos-
sible for torture or other intentional torts not only to be within the scope
of an employee's employment but also foreseeable? If it is foreseeable
that an official governmental employee will torture a detainee, and that
torture is within the scope of their employment, it should also follow
that it is foreseeable that a U.S. contractor would torture or intentionally
acting within the scope of their employment in a suit by former Guantinamo Bay detainees
alleging that they were tortured).
68. 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006).
69. See id. at 31-36.
70. Id. at 33.
71. Id. at 36.
72. Id. at 35 (quoting Weinberg v. Johnson, 518 A.2d 985, 989 (D.C. 1986)); see also
Weinberg, 518 A.2d at 989 ("[W]here an employee is in the course of performing job duties, the
employee is presumed to be intending, at least in part, to further the employer's interests.").
73. Rasul, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
74. Id. (quoting Majano v. Kim, No. CIV.A.04-201, 2005 WL 839546, at *8 (D.D.C. Apr. 11,
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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harm a detainee." Additionally, that conduct should likely be deemed
within the scope of expected behavior of a similarly situated governmen-
tal employee. To find otherwise would create a virtually unworkable
scheme. By drawing a line in the sand between contractors and govern-
ment employees based simply on who signs their paychecks allows for
zero transparency and accountability for those entities responsible for
defining the job descriptions of a contractor or governmental employee
who later abuses a detainee. If this conduct is truly foreseeable, the
government should not outsource it to a private contractor to shirk liabil-
ity. Rather, the government should be even more vigilant when
assigning duties that could raise questions of abuse to contractors who
may or may not be actually accountable to the government.
3. FOREIGN-COUNTRY EXCEPTION
The FTCA does not apply to any claim arising in a foreign coun-
try.78 The foreign-country exception was interpreted broadly by the
Supreme Court's watershed decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.79 In
Sosa, a Mexican national sued the United States for having him kid-
napped from Mexico in order to prosecute him in the United States.8"
The Court held that the foreign-country exception barred his FTCA
claims against the United States because the injury that formed the basis
of his claim actually arose out of the kidnapping event that occurred on
Mexican soil.8" For purposes of the foreign-country exception, the
Court held that an action arises where the injury occurs, even if the tor-
tious conduct, such as the order to kidnap someone, occurred else-
where.8" The court rejected the "headquarters exception" to the foreign-
country exception that had developed in some lower courts.83 That
exception allowed for FTCA liability for tortious conduct that occurred
overseas if officials at some "headquarters" within the United States
77. This argument would defeat the Justice Department's contention that David Passaro's
actions when he beat Abdul Wali were the actions of a rogue officer. If abuse of prisoners and
detainees is foreseeable, then Passaro's actions should also have been expected.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000).
79. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 707-12 (2004).
80. Id. at 698-99.
81. Id. at 712.
82. See id. ("[T]he FTCA's foreign country exception bars all claims based on any injury
suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred.").
Further, this essentially gives the United States a proverbial blank check to commit injuries
overseas without fear of liability. A far better solution would be to adhere to a standard that
reflects not the physical location of any incident, but rather an approach that favored
accountability for those individuals or countries that actually instigated whatever conduct created
the injury.
83. Id. at 701-12.
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approved it. 84
As applied in the case of abuse suffered at the hands of a govern-
ment-directed contractor, the foreign-country exception would foreclose
any claim against an independent contractor for an injury that occurred
outside the territory of the United States." This is troubling considering
the United States' increased activities overseas. Should the government
not be held accountable to the same standard overseas as it would be on
its own soil? Why should the United States be allowed to abdicate
responsibility simply because its actions took place abroad?
4. INTENTIONAL-TORT EXCEPTION
The intentional-tort exception generally provides that the FTCA
does not apply to "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, [or] false arrest."86 This provision is qualified by certain
restrictions that apply to law-enforcement officers acting within the
scope of their employment.87 Accordingly, the intentional-tort excep-
tion does not bar FTCA claims for intentional torts that fall within the
law-enforcement proviso. For example, the provision allows abuse vic-
tims at the hands of federal law-enforcement officers to sue the United
States under the FTCA for money damages without having the claim
barred by the intentional-torts exception.88 The FTCA defines investiga-
tive or law-enforcement officers to mean "any officer of the United
States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence,
or to make arrests for violations of Federal law." 89 Accordingly, the
United States may potentially use the intentional-tort exception to
escape liability for torture by those who lack law-enforcement powers.
The question remains: Is there any time in which the U.S. government
would empower private contractors with law-enforcement powers?
Although the answer from U.S. officials would likely be a resounding
"no," incidents like David Passaro's interrogation of an Afghan detainee
suggest that contractors are often employed to act like law-enforcement
personnel.90 Is applying the specific labels of "contractor" or "law-
84. Id. at 701.
85. But cf Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Guantanamo
Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory .... ). Contra Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v.
Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (holding that Guantdnamo is not a U.S. territory
for purposes of statutes relied on in that case by Cuban and Haitian immigrants temporarily
detained there). With the expansion of the U.S. military's bases abroad, perhaps the time has
come to reevaluate the idea of what constitutes a U.S. territory.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
87. Id.
88. Id. at (h), (i).
89. Id. at (h).
90. See supra Part I (discussing David Passaro's interrogation of Abdul Wali).
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enforcement officer" merely semantics, or is there something far more
dubious occurring? Under the current legal regime, it is possible for the
United States to use this exception as a means of shirking liability for
injuries resulting from abuse suffered at the hands of a contractor, even
though he ostensibly is fulfilling the role of a law-enforcement officer.
B. Constitutional Violations
Federal courts have long been the forums for vindicating constitu-
tional rights. 91 The legal basis for constitutional-tort claims against fed-
eral officials was first embraced openly by the Supreme Court in Ex
Parte Young,9" and then later revitalized in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.93 In Bivens, the
Court recognized a federal cause of action for money damages against
the federal agents who violated the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment
rights.94 In later cases, the Court recognized Bivens claims for violations
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amend-
ment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.95 The court in Bivens,
however, held that a constitutional-tort claim may be defeated in two
situations.96 The first is when defendants demonstrate "special factors
counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress."97 The second is "when defendants show that Congress has pro-
vided an alternative remedy which is explicitly declared to be a
substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as
equally effective."98 The key in Bivens actions is that the victim must
show a constitutional violation.99 As such, the main issue in the govern-
91. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65
(Transaction 2007) (1928); see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974) (quoting
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967) (quoting
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra); see also Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1995) (stating that before 1875, state courts provided the only
forum for vindication of many important federal rights).
92. 209 U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908) (holding that jurisdiction was appropriate under the federal-
question statute for a constitutional challenge to a statute regulating railroad rates).
93. 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971).
94. See id. at 391-97.
95. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16-24 (1980) (recognizing a cause of action against
federal prison officials for their deliberate indifference to decedent's serious medical needs while
in prison); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979) (recognizing a cause of action for an
alleged violation of the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment brought against a
former member of Congress who, while in Congress, fired the plaintiff from his staff because she
was a woman).
96. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
97. Id. at 396.
98. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1262 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at
397 and Davis, 442 U.S. at 245-47).
99. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
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ment-directed contractor-abuse case is showing that an alien has consti-
tutional rights under the Court's jurisprudence. 00 The Court has held
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure of
property that belongs to a nonresident alien and is located in a foreign
country."0 ' The Court based its holding on reasoning that could prevent
aliens from relying on the Fourth Amendment to assert claims of exces-
sive force based on official conduct that occurs outside the United
States.10 2 In addition to limiting the Fourth Amendment, the Court has
held that the Fifth Amendment "does not confer a right of personal
security" upon certain enemy aliens." 3 More broadly, the Court also
added that "[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance
of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own
citizens."'" Accordingly, it is likely that any claim from an alien
regarding an incident that occurred abroad would fail to receive constitu-
tional protection.10 5
In addition, this scenario may present "special factors counseling
100. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed the question of citizenship most
recently in Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In Boumediene, the court held the
recent amendments to the habeas corpus statutes applied to foreign-enemy combatants detained at
the naval base in GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba thus essentially stripping detainees from any habeas
review of their detention because of their alien status. Id. at 986-88. The court argued that
because the administration explicitly disclaims any sovereignty rights over the Naval base in
Cuba, constitutional protections should not be extended to detainees. Id. at 990-92. The court
noted, however, that the detainees cited the Insular Cases "in which 'fundamental personal rights'
extended to U.S. territories." Id. at 992 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922)
and Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904)).
101. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-76 (1990).
102. See id. at 271-76 (finding evidence that the term "people" in the Fourth Amendment does
not include aliens without a "substantial connection" to the United States). In the government-
directed contractor-abuse case, it would be incredibly difficult for a victim of abuse from an
independent contractor abroad to demonstrate the requisite "substantial connection."
103. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950); see also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
at 269 (characterizing Eisentrager as rejecting the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth
Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States). But how would this
doctrine apply to U.S. military bases or embassies abroad? Should this restriction be limited
within the confines of the continental United States? Bases and embassies are considered
sovereign territories, so why should there be a distinction in rights available to detainees?
104. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
105. See, e.g., In re GuantAnamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005). In that
case, Judge Joyce Hens Green addressed eleven coordinated habeas cases involving aliens being
detained by the United States as "enemy combatants" at Guantnamo Bay. Id. at 445. These
detainees were seized in Afghanistan. Denying in part the government's motion to dismiss the
petitions, the district court held that "the petitioners have stated valid claims under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and that the procedures implemented by the
government to confirm that the petitioners are 'enemy combatants' subject to indefinite detention
violate the petitioners' rights to due process of law." Id. The district court further ruled that the
Taliban, but not the al Qaeda detainees, were entitled to the protections of the Third and Fourth
Geneva Conventions. Id. at 478-80.
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hesitation," thus again rendering a Bivens action inoperable.10 6 The
Court has said that "Bivens action[s] might be unavailable" to aliens for
constitutional violations in foreign countries.'0 7 The Court explained
that the foreign location and the particular identity of the claimant may
constitute "special factors counseling hesitation."'' 0 8 The Court is likely
hesitant to recognize a Bivens claim when doing so would require judi-
cial review of the executive branch's conduct of foreign affairs and mili-
tary strategy, as may be true of outsourcing of governmental projects
abroad to contractors that have arisen from the War on Terror."'° In
addition, Bivens claims were primarily designed to impose liability upon
the rogue officer who violates someone's constitutional rights either
deliberately or out of plain incompetence. This does not address the
issue of an independent contractor carrying out direct executive orders
from the government.
V. MINDING THE LIABILITY GAP
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. . . . [I]t
teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy.
-Justice Brandeis"
As evidenced from above, there is a striking gap in the rights of
aliens to be free from U.S.-directed torture at the hands of "independent"
contractors and the remedies available against the United States as a
sovereign for instigating such abuse abroad. This is precisely the type of
behavior that should be deterred. But the question remains: What should
be done about this disparity between rights and remedies? Is this not the
type of behavior that the international community wants to deter? It is
incredibly dangerous to have a legal system that creates no accountabil-
ity for actions of a sovereign simply outsourced to independent contrac-
tors. This problem cannot be permitted to continue where governmental
contractors are being used to carry out torture and other abuses abroad.
106. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 396 (1971).
107. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274.
108. Id.
109. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279-83 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (distinguishing the
facts from Rasul, and arguing that the foreign-policy considerations barred a Bivens claim by a
torture victim whom defendant United States rendered to Syria for torture); see also Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (arguing that "the special
needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the creation of damage remedies against military
and foreign policy officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing
injury abroad").
110. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Congress has chosen on several occasions in the past to set stan-
dards for accountability for international human-rights abuses such as
torture and extrajudicial killings. For example, Congress has enacted the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 ("TVPA").111 The TVPA sym-
bolically represents the United States' unequivocal contempt for torture,
thereby setting the standard for other countries to follow. In addition,
the TVPA reaffirms the United States' commitment to the protection of
torture victims by ensuring that they receive adequate and just compen-
sation and guaranteeing that the United States does not become a sanctu-
ary for international torturers. 1 2  Specifically, the TVPA establishes
civil liability for acts of torture and extrajudicial killings abroad.1 1 3 The
TVPA applies only to acts taken under color of official authority and
recognizes as a defense the existence of remedies in the country where
the violation allegedly occurred.1 14
The TVPA is not the only legislation adopted by the United States
to demonstrate its adamant stance against torture and extrajudicial kill-
ings. The United States also opened its courthouse doors to aliens suing
private entities in tort under the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA").115
ATCA gives federal courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States."' 1 6
In addition to the TVPA and ATCA, Congress has also enacted the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA"). 1 7 The FSIA pro-
vides a mechanism by which foreign sovereigns or agents thereof can be
111. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note)
("An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation-
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual
.... ").
112. See id.; see also AMNESTY INT'L, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTmS 28 (1984) (stating that torture
has been widely condemned in international law).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1350, historical and revision notes, provides in pertinent part:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation-
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to
that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a
claimant in an action for wrongful death.
Id.
114. The TVPA creates liability for an individual who acts "under actual or apparent authority,
or color of law, of any foreign nation." Id. To prove a claim, the plaintiff is required to "establish
some governmental involvement in the torture or killing." Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250,
264 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
116. Id.
117. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000).
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sued in U.S. federal courts." 8 The claimant must show that the sover-
eign fits within one of the exceptions contained in the FSIA, usually an
act that would duplicate actions that a private citizen would under-
take." 9 The FSIA has been used to hold sovereign governments
accountable in the past. In the notable case, Alejandre v. Republic of
Cuba, the court issued a multimillion-dollar judgment against the Cuban
government for the deaths of three Americans that resulted from the
Cuban Air Force shooting down the Brothers to the Rescue humanitarian
flight.120 In that case, this legislation was used again to demonstrate the
United States' zero-tolerance policy on terrorism and extrajudicial
killings.
The TVPA, ATCA, and FSIA represent Congress's willingness to
legislate within the field of international human-rights abuses. So what
now? What is the best course of action in closing this gap of liability
that has left the U.S. government "untouchable?" Further, what action
could provide the necessary deterrent to ensure that American contrac-
tors are abiding by even the most basic tenets of American law in their
conduct in Iraq?
One solution is to increase the level of internal accountability
among the defense contractors being used in the War on Terror. In the
past, the Department of Defense has been plagued with failure upon fail-
ure of its contracting scheme and mechanisms of cost and mission
accountability.' 2' Experiments in streamlined contracting processes
have allowed the military to pay contractors for a flexible delivery order
rather than specifying a detailed agreement by contract. 22 The Depart-
ment of Interior's Inspector General investigating the Abu Ghraib situa-
tion reported that CACI, a private contractor, was given orders
predominantly for interrogations, intelligence, and security services in
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1243-46 (S.D. Fla. 1997). The personal representatives of the
deceased brought action against the Republic of Cuba and the Cuban Air Force after three U.S.
citizens flying civilian airplanes were shot down by Cuban fighter planes over international
waters. Id. at 1242. The court found that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence that the Air
Force and Cuba could be considered liable under the FSIA exception. Id. at 1247-48. The court
found both the Cuban Air Force and the Republic of Cuba liable for damages under the theory of
respondeat superior. Id. at 1249. The court awarded substantial compensatory and punitive
damages to the plaintiffs. Id. at 1249-52. But the theory of respondeat superior only allowed the
foreign state to be liable for compensatory damages and not for punitive damages. Id. at 1253-54.
121. Not only has there been failures regulating the activities of contractors abroad, but even
some suggest that contractors are scamming the government out of money. "[T]he name
'Haliburton' has become synonymous with 'no-bid contract,' which in the media evokes images
of gross cronyism and taxpayer rip-off." Patricia H. Wittie, News from the Chair, PROCUREMENT
LAW., Winter 2005, at 2, 2.
122. Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability
in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 549, 569 (2005).
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Iraq.12 3 Yet, doesn't involving private entities in interrogations cross the
line into the arena of centrally government work? 124  A long-standing
executive policy, now expressed in the Office of Management and
Budget Circular, directs that inherently governmental functions should
not be outsourced. 125 Congress adopted the Federal Activities Inventory
Reform Act ("FAIR") in 1998, which requires agencies to inventory
civil-service work and to identify jobs as commercial or inherently gov-
ernmental in order to assist the privatization effort. 126 But even with a
statute on the books that separates commercial from governmental activ-
ities, disagreements over classification and the governmental capacity
continue. 127  For example, officially speaking, a contractor may be
entrusted with providing security as well as driving trucks to transport
soldiers, equipment, and other supplies; but when does this function
move from civilian to core military? 128 The Department of Defense has
not created or consistently applied standards or benchmarks to identify
and track what functions must remain within the government and those
activities that may be outsourced.129
As shown, the Department of Defense is unable to regulate itself.
As the War on Terror continues, it is obvious that the number of private
contractors is only going to increase, and the task of classifying their
duties will become virtually impossible. One would think that the gov-
123. See id. at 555; see also Joshua Chaffin, Private Workers Found Central to Jail Abuse,
FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 27, 2004, at 7 (discussing CACI's role in the interrogation of detainees
at Abu Ghraib).
124. See Schooner, supra note 122, at 555.
125. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB Cm. No. A-
76, PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL AcTIvITEs (2003). This document includes a categorization
of governmental activities into commercial and inherently governmental. Inherently
governmental jobs would be those "so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by government personnel." Id. Functions may be "inherently governmental" where
they involve discretion and sovereign authority that could bind the U.S. and "[s]ignificantly
affect[ ] the life, liberty, or property of private persons." Id.
126. Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382 (1998) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 501
note) (stating that in using the private sector for needed commercial services, officials are to
identify savings and also identify non-inherently governmental functions to enable cost
comparisons between private bids and public budgets); see Mary E. Haney, The Quiet
Revolution: Downsizing, Outsourcing, and Best Value, 158 MIL. L. REV. 48, 61-92 (1998)
(describing FAIR, Circular A-76, and the competitive cost comparison process).
127. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, IMPROVING THE
SOURCING DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1 (2002), http:llwww.gao.gov/new.items/
d02847t.pdf.
128. See Schooner, supra note 122, at 556 n.20 (describing fights within the government over
outsourcing what may be inherently governmental functions).
129. See id. at 553-54. "'Just as the distinction between combat arms and non-combat arms
has become blurred during operations, the distinction between 'advising' and 'doing' for these
contractors is similarly blurred,' writes Major Thomas Milton of the Foreign Area Officer
Association." KEN SILVERSTEIN, PRIVATE WARRIORS 166 (2000).
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ernment would want to keep an eye out for what their contractors are
actually doing in the field. But at the end of the day, if the liability will
ultimately befall the contractor, absent international or domestic pres-
sure, the United States has no incentive to monitor its contractors. 30
A far better idea is creating a statute that would attach liability to
the federal government for abuses carried out by their contractors
abroad. With the numerous exceptions to the FTCA virtually eliminat-
ing U.S. liability abroad, and with the questionable status of the consti-
tutional rights for aliens, a new statute is the only way to ensure
accountability. This new statute should impose restrictions on what
exactly can be outsourced to independent contractors, create standards of
oversight, and create liability for the U.S. government in tort when the
statute is violated.
This proposed legislation would have numerous critics from all
realms of government and business. Contractors would likely be against
it for the sheer fact that it is likely to reduce the amount of business they
can perform under lucrative governmental contracts. But contractors
should welcome the new legislation. By clearly defining duties of the
contractor and keeping such duties within the "commercial realm," con-
tractors will likely face a sharp reduction in suits brought against them.
Further, clearly defined directives allow liability to be correctly assessed
to the appropriate party. At the current state of affairs, the line between
the government and the contractor is blurred, leaving each entity to
blame each other. Clearly delineated standards create transparency
within the system.
In addition, Congress could potentially achieve a secondary objec-
tive by enacting such legislation. By regulating the conduct and activi-
ties of governmental contractors, Congress far reduces the ability of the
United States to function as a military force in Iraq. Congress could
essentially force a military stand-down and withdrawal by enforcing a
statute that would assess liability on the government for allowing and or
directing governmental contractors to participate in activities that are
inherently governmental. This approach would allow Congress not only
to circumvent the bad publicity that would result by pulling funds
directly from the American troops, but would also would deter govern-
mental departments from entrusting contractors with tasks that are inher-
ently governmental.
130. Even American television is aware of the contractor crisis in Iraq. Popular television
shows like Law & Order often take up controversial contractor issues in the War on Terror. This
shows that this problem is not as hidden as some governmental departments may suggest. See
Law & Order: America, Inc. (NBC television broadcast Mar. 22, 2006) (dealing with the use of
private military firms that handle military-support functions in the Iraq war).
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The executive branch of the U.S. government is also likely to
oppose this proposition. Clearly, it is rare that the government would
welcome a statute abrogating sovereign immunity for additional torts by
contractors with open arms. As discussed previously, however, the
United States has done this before. After all, it would be hypocritical for
the United States to chastise foreign nations and other international enti-
ties for sanctioning terrorism and employing torture techniques in their
interrogations when the U.S. government can slyly outsource liability
and get away with the exact same thing. 3 ' That is a dark accusation,
but without accountability there is no way to ensure that outsourcing
otherwise illegal activity to escape liability does not occur.
VI. CONCLUSION
The objector and the rebel who raises his voice against what he
believes to be the injustice of the present and the wrongs of the past is
the one who hunches the world along.
-Clarence S. Darrow
In this paper, I have shown that an alien suffering abuse at the
hands of government-directed contractor abroad is entitled to a civil
remedy against the entity ultimately responsible as a means of ensuring
that "wrongs" do not become "rights." In today's era of privatization, it
is essential the U.S. government not be given unlimited freedom to out-
source torture and other abuses to escape liability. As referenced above,
the problem of "contractors behaving badly" has only begun its violent
spiral out of control. The problem is only going to get worse as Ameri-
can contempt for the war in Iraq grows, and the reliance on private con-
tractors to conduct military activities increases. This paper implores
Congress to act. Whether Congress acts to plug the gap between the
rights of the victims and remedies available in U.S. courts, or as a back-
door tool where Congress reigns in the President's actions in Iraq, the
bottom line is something must be done-and soon. After all, it should
be the duty of our government to ensure that American contractors in
Iraq are abiding by the most basic tenets of American and international
law. This gap between rights and remedies must be mended to ensure
the accountability of the United States and its contractors abroad. Leav-
ing that gap unattended only makes the United States a victim of its own
negligence and failure to act. Minding the liability gap will undoubtedly
work toward the guarantee of the elimination of outsourcing impunity.
To do so would truly ensure liberty and justice for all.
131. See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1250-53 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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